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Recent Developments 
Harford County v. Town of Bel Air: 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a 
county does not enjoy 
governmental immunity in 
actions for breach of contract, 
regardless of whether or not the 
contract involves a governmental 
function. Harford County v. 
Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 
704 A.2d 421 (1998). In a 
unanimous decision, the court 
ruled that a county may not 
abrogate its obligations under a 
valid contract even by reason of 
performing governmental 
functions for public good. The 
court also held that, under the 
doctrines of legal impossibility 
and frustration of purpose, 
changes in state regulations do 
not, by themselves, relieve the 
county of its contractual liabilities. 
In so holding, the court 
reaffirmed the rule that counties 
and municipalities are to be 
treated differently from State 
agencies, for the purpose of 
immunity in contract actions. 
In 1954, Harford County and 
the Town of Bel Air executed a 
lease agreement upon which Bel 
Air leased acreage from the 
county. Bel Air used a portion of 
this land as a landfill. In 1969, 
the parties entered into a new 
agreement, which replaced the 
1954 contract. Pursuant to the 
1969 contract, Bel Air agreed to 
relinquish its claim to the twenty-
five acres to which it was entitled 
under the 1954 contract. In 
exchange, the county agreed to 
provide adequate facilities for the 
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disposal of all refuse that 
originated from Bel Air, at no "on-
site expense" to Bel Air. This 
agreement was to last for a term 
of ninety-nine years. 
In 1992, however, the 
county enacted an ordinance 
that imposed a thirty-five dollar 
per ton "tipping" fee on solid 
waste deposited in the county's 
facilities. The ordinance, 
according to the county, was 
necessary to accomplish the 
objective of the Maryland 
Recycling Act of 1988, which 
required the county to recycle 
twenty percent of its solid waste. 
Following the 1992 ordinance, 
the county attempted to charge 
Bel Air for the waste being 
deposited in the county's 
facilities. 
Bel Air sought a declaratory 
judgment in the Circuit Court for 
Harford County, contending, 
among other things, that the fee 
in question violated the 1969 
agreement. The circuit court 
agreed, and ruled that the 1969 
contract exempted Bel Air from 
payment of the fees. The county 
appealed that ruling. Before a 
hearing in the court of special 
appeals, both the county and Bel 
Air petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari, which the court of 
appeals granted. 
The court of appeals focused 
primarily on the county's 
argument that Maryland law 
entitled it to governmental 
immunity in contract suits. 
Harford County v. Town of Bel 
Air, 348 Md. 363, 371, 704 A.2d 
421, 424 (1998). The county, 
relying on a line of cases dating 
back to 1866, argued that it had 
the right to repudiate any 
contractual obligations incurred 
in the performance of a 
governmental function if such 
repudiation would serve public 
good. Id. According to the 
county, since the disposal of 
waste involved a governmental, 
not a proprietary, function, it was 
immune from any such 
contractual liabilities. Id. 
The court of appeals rejected 
the argument by first noting that 
counties and municipalities in 
Maryland have never been 
accorded immunity in contract 
cases. Harford, 348 Md. at 372, 
704 A.2d at 425. (citing Board v. 
Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 
389,578 A.2d 207,210 (1990». 
Generally, governmental 
immunity in contract cases has 
only been extended to the State 
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and its agencies. Id. Although 
counties are State creations, 
they have always been treated 
differently from State agencies, 
and have enjoyed immunity only 
with respect to certain tort 
actions. Id. Thus, the court 
concluded, the question of 
whether the actions under 
scrutiny involved a governmental 
or proprietary function arises 
only in tort situations. Id. at 373, 
704 A.2d 425. 
As to the cases relied on by 
the county, the court rejected the 
county's interpretation of them. 
Id. The court looked particularly 
to the previous explanation of 
Lake Roland Elevated Ry. Co. 
and Rittenhouse by American 
Structures v. City of Baltimore, 
278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 
(1976). Id. at 374, 704 A.2d at 
426. According to the court, 
these cases specifically stand for 
th e proposition that 
"municipalities and counties [are] 
subject to suit in contract actions, 
whether the contracts were 
made in the performance of a 
governmental or proprietary 
function ... " Id. at 387, 704 
A.2d at 426. (quoting American 
Structures, 278 Md. 356, 359-60, 
364 A.2d 55 (1976». Moreover, 
Lake Roland and Rittenhouse 
concerned the constitutional 
challenge of certain city 
ordinances that repealed 
previously granted contractual 
rights. Id. at 380, 704 A.2d at 
429. In holding that the 
ordinances were valid under the 
Contract Clause, the courts did 
not create local governmental 
28.2 U. Bait LF.J. 26 
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The court of appeals then 
considered whether the county's 
performance of its obligations 
under the 1969 contract was 
frustrated or made legally 
impossible by the" enactment of 
the Maryland Recycling Act of 
1988. Id. at 384,704 A.2d 431. 
The court observed that, under 
the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose, the determination of 
whether the 1988 Act thwarted 
the county's contractual 
performance depended on three 
factors: (1) whether the 
enactment of the Act was 
reasonably foreseeable; (2) 
whether the Act was enacted by 
a sovereign power; and (3) 
whether the parties were 
instrumental to the passage of 
the Act. Id. (citing Montauk 
Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md. 491, 
499, 138 A.2d 907, 911 (1.958». 
The court noted that the 
contract could only be found 
legally impossible or frustrated if 
performance under it was made 
objectively impossible by the 
1988 Act. Id. at 386, 704 A.2d at 
432. (citing Levine v. Rendler, 
272 Md. 1, 7-12, 320 A.2d 258, 
262-5 (1974». The court found 
that none of the above doctrines 
worked to relieve the county of 
its obligations to Bel Air. Id. at 
387, 704 A.2d at 432-33. It 
rejected the argument that the 
1988 Act's requirement of 
"recycling" frustrated the parties' 
contemplation of "disposal" in the 
1969 agreement. Id. The court 
looked to the statutory definition 
of "solid waste acceptance 
facility". Id. "Facility," according 
to the court, is broadly defined to 
include "any other type plant the 
primary purpose of which is for 
the disposal, treatment or 
processing of solid waste." Id. 
(quoting Md. Ann. Code art. 43, 
section 387C(a)(16) (1980 Rep. 
Vol.». Since, from this definition, 
"disposal" includes "recycling," 
the contractual contemplation of 
the parties was neither frustrated 
nor made legally impossible. Id. 
Moreover, the 1988 Act was 
reasonably foreseeable. Id. The 
Act, although expensive to the 
county, did not prevent the 
exemption of Bel Air from the 
thirty-five dollar fee. Id. at 388, 
704 A.2d at 433. 
The deCision of the court of 
appeals in Harford County v. 
Town of Bel Air that a county is 
not entitled to governmental 
immunity in contract suits is 
consistent with Maryland public 
policy. The modern trend has 
been to curtail counties' freedom 
to escape liabilities via the quick 
enactment of local legislation. 
Because of the distinctive nature 
of local legislative process, the 
extension of governmental 
immunity in contract cases could 
lead to the violation of the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The court of 
appeals has further ensured that 
a county cannot by an ordinance 
excuse itself of long-time 
obligations just because 
changes in times have made old 
bargains unprofitable or more 
costly. 
